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Abstract
Kobayashi, Nakajima, and Inaba (2007) show that in the neoclassical business cycle models
with collateral constraints, a boom can be generated in response to an optimistic change in
expectations on the future state of the economy. They call this business cycle a news-driven
cycle. In their models, land is used as collateral, and borrowing for working capital is limited
by the value of collateralized land. We simplify their model to the one without land. We
show that in the economy where capital goods are used as collateral, the news-driven cycles
can be generated.
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Recently, there has been a growing interest in the role of changes in expectations
or news about the future state of the economy as a driving force of business cycles
(see the seminal contribution by Beaudry and Portier (2004), which is followed by,
for example, Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2006), and Jaimovich and Rebelo
(2006)). As is well known, however, changes in expectations (or news shocks)
move consumption and labor in the opposite directions due to the wealth eﬀect
in the standard neoclassical business cycle models. To enable news shocks to
generate plausible business cycles in which consumption, labor, and investment
comove, the recent literature introduces complicated modiﬁcations in preferences
and/or technology. The business cycles generated by news shocks are called the
news-driven business cycles.1 Kobayashi, Nakajima, and Inaba (2007) (hereafter,
KNI) show that only if the working capital, such as labor payment, is subject
to collateral constraint, the standard model can generate the news-driven cycles.
They assume that a productive asset with ﬁxed supply (“land”) is used as collateral,
and that ﬁrms need to hold collateral to ﬁnance wage payment and payments for
intermediate inputs: These payments are limited by the value of collateralized
land. In this setting, the news of an increase in the future productivity generates
a boom today as follows. The news raises the price of land today, which relaxes
the collateral constraint. Since the wage payment is collateral constrained, the
relaxation of the collateral constraint reduces the ineﬃciency in the labor market.
It shifts the labor demand curve outward. If this force is suﬃciently strong, it
oﬀsets the wealth eﬀect on the labor supply schedule, and the equilibrium labor
supply increases. So do output and investment. Consumption increases because
the wealth eﬀect of the good news.
In the present paper, we show that the similar mechanism works in models
without land. Instead of introducing land, we introduce the adjustment costs for
investment ` a la Hayashi (1982) in the standard neoclassical growth model. We
assume that capital is used as collateral and the price of collateralized asset is
Tobin’s Q. In our model, the good news about the future raises Tobin’s Q and
generates the news-driven cycle today by relaxing the collateral constraint.
In this paper, we consider two models: The representative household model and
the two-agent model with households and entrepreneurs. Both models are variants
of Model 1 in KNI, in which collateral constraint ` a la Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
arises from the borrowers’ lack of commitment.
1Some economists call them the expectations-driven business cycles, the boom-bust cycles, or
Pigou cycles.
12. One-agent model
This model is identical to Model 1 in KNI except that there is no land in this
model, the capital goods are used as collateral, and the capital goods are produced
from the consumption goods (i.e., investment) and the existing stock of capital.
During a period, a household splits to a manager and a worker. The manager
produces the consumption goods buying labor input and material input from an-
other household. The worker supplies the labor to a ﬁrm that is run by another
household’s manager. The manager needs to pay the costs for inputs in advance
of production. We assume that the payment for inputs is made by trade credit,
which is subject to collateral constraint. The collateral constraint arises because
the managers cannot commit themselves to repay debt; and if the managers repu-
diate, the creditors seize the collateralized capital stocks and collect on the loans
by selling the capital stocks in the market.2 We deﬁne the variables as follows: ct
is consumption, nt labor supply of the worker, ˜ nt labor demand of the manager,
kt capital stock at the end of period t, it investment, zt capital goods produced
by investment technology (see below), wt wage rate, At productivity (Harrod neu-
tral), gt growth rate of At (gt = ln(At=At¡1)), mt material input, yt gross output,
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where (2) is the budget constraint, (3) is the production technology of consumption
goods, (4) is the collateral constraint, (5) is the law of motion for capital, and (6) is
the investment technology that produces capital goods. The productivity evolves
following an exogenous stochastic process:
ln(At+1=At) = ½g ln(At=At¡1) + (1 ¡ ½g)ln(g) + "
g
t+1; (7)
where 0 · ½g < 1 and "
g
t+1 is an i.i.d. shock. The investment technology is charac-
terized by the installation function, Φ(x), where Φ(0) = 0, Φ0(x) > 0, Φ00(x) < 0,
and Φ(±) = ±. Note that the functional form of Φ(x) is diﬀerent from the level
2See also KNI for more details about the reason why collateral constraint arises.
2speciﬁcation for the adjustment cost proposed by Christiano, Motto, and Ros-
tagno (2006). Christiano et al. uses ΦC(x) = x¡¾C(x¡±)2. The diﬀerence is that
ΦC(x) < x < Φ(x) for 0 < x < ±. In order to introduce collateral constraint (4),
we need to assume that the capital stock can be traded in the decentralized market
at price qt. If we use Φ(x), the investment process is easily decentralized, while
ΦC(x) is not consistent with the assumption of decentralized market for capital
goods. In the experiment in Section 4, we assume Φ(x) = ¾ ln(x + a) + b. The
market clearing conditions are
nt = ˜ nt; (8)
ct + it + mt = yt: (9)
The competitive equilibrium is the set of prices fwt;qtg1
t=0 and the associated al-
locations fct;nt; ˜ nt;it;kt;mt;ytg1
t=0, such that the allocations solve the households’
problem given the prices and the initial capital stock k¡1, and that the market
clearing conditions are satisﬁed.
3. Two-agent model
We can easily modify the model in the previous section to a two-agent version.
There are representative households and entrepreneurs. Households consume,
supply labor, and buy capital stocks. Entrepreneurs consume, produce the con-
sumption goods buying labor from households and material input from other en-
trepreneurs, and accumulate capital stocks. In order to decentralize the investment
process, we assume that there are competitive investment ﬁrms that produce cap-
ital goods from the consumption goods and existing capital stock.
We deﬁne the variables as follows: ct is consumption of household, c0
t consump-
tion of entrepreneur, nt labor, kt capital stock of household at the end of period
t, k0
t capital stock of entrepreneur at the end of period t, Kt total capital input
for production, it investment, zt capital goods produced by the investment ﬁrms,
wt wage rate, ri;t rental rate of capital for investment (i.e., production of capital
goods), rk;t rental rate of capital for production of consumer goods, ¼t proﬁt of
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The market clearing conditions are
ct + c
0
t + it + mt = yt; (19)
kt¡1 + k
0
t¡1 = Kt; (20)
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + zt: (21)





t=0, such that the allocations
solve the households’ problem, the entrepreneurs’ problem and the investment
ﬁrms’ problem, given the prices and the initial capital stocks (k¡1;k0
¡1), and that
the market clearing conditions are satisﬁed.
4. News-shock experiments
Our numerical experiments follow KNI. For t · 4, the economy is at the deter-
ministic steady state, where all agents believe that there shall be no productivity
shock at all in the future: "
g
t = 0 for all t. In period t = 5, the agents receive news
that there will be a positive productivity shock at t = 10: "
g
10 = :01. The agents
are totally conﬁdent about the news, so that, for t = 5;:::;9, they believe that
"
g
10 = :01 with probability one. At t = 10, however, the news may or may not turn
4Table 1: Parameter values
parameter symbol value
discount factor of households ¯ .99
curvature of households’ utility function µ .75
steady-state labor supply n 1/3
discount factor of entrepreneurs ¯0 ¯ ¤ :973
curvature of entrepreneurs’ utility function Ã 1
share of material in production ´ .5
relative share of capital to labor in production ® .36
steady-state technology growth ¯ g 0
parameter for capital production function ¾ .02
depreciation rate of capital ± .025
persistence of technology growth ½g .95
tightness of collateral constraint (one-agent model) ' .05
(two-agent model) .15
out to be true. There is no productivity shock except possibly at t = 10: "
g
t = 0
for t 6= 10.
Parameter values are given in Table 1. Most of them are taken from KNI.
The weight of leasure, °, in households’ utility is set so that the steady-state
labor supply equals to 1/3. We specify Φ(x) as Φ(x) = ¾ ln(x + a) + b, and (a,
b) is set to be a solution of the simultaneous equations: Φ(0) = 0 and Φ(±) = ±,
given ¾. ¾ is the key parameter for our results. We set ¾ so that the production
function of capital goods has a suﬃcient curvature. The tightness of the collateral
constraints, ', is set so that the constraints are binding.
We report the cases in which the news turns out to be false at t = 10. Simulation
method is due to Uhlig (1999).3 Figure 1 plots the dynamic response of the one-
agent model to the news shock. It shows that the good news raises output (value
added), consumption, investment, and labor for t = 5;6;¢¢¢ ;9: It also shows that
the total factor productivity (TFP) moves procyclically. TFP in this ﬁgure, ˜ At, is
deﬁned by yt¡mt = ˜ Atk®
t¡1n
1¡®
t . The reason why we introduce the material input is
to induce the procyclical TFP. Our models without the material also can generate
the news-driven cycles. As KNI argue in detail, the boom in response to good news
is generated from the decrease in ineﬃciency in the input markets. The ineﬃciency,
xt, is deﬁned by xt = ¹t=¸t, where ¸t and ¹t are the Lagrange multipliers associated
with (2) and (4), respectively. As Figure 1 shows, the ineﬃciency falls for t =






























Figure 1: News-driven cycles (1): One-agent model
5;6;¢¢¢ ;9.
Figure 2 plots the response of the two-agent model. In this case too, a good
news about the future causes a boom for t = 5;6;¢¢¢ ;9. As KNI argue, having two
types of agents brings about a new feature. In the one-agent model shown in Figure
1, when the news actually turns out to be false, the economy essentially jumps
back to the initial steady state, although there are some transitional dynamics. In
particular, false information does not cause a recession: the level of output does
not get lower than the steady state level. Figure 2 shows that in our two-agent
model, however, the economy falls into a recession if the news turns out to be
wrong. The mechanism of recession is the same as that in the second model in
KNI: When the good news arrives, the price of the collateral asset increases, and








































Figure 2: News-driven cycles (2): Two-agent model
collateral. Hence, in response to the good news about future, entrepreneurs sell
their capital. When the news turns out to be wrong, the price of capital essentially
goes back to its steady state level. However, since the share of capital held by
entrepreneurs is lower than the steady state level, the value of their collateral
becomes lower than the steady state level. It follows that the ﬁnancial constraint
becomes tighter, which increases the labor market ineﬃciency, and reduces labor,
output, and consumption.
5. Conclusion
There is a growing literature that proposes various models for news-driven cycles,
or the business cycles driven by changes in expectations or news about the future
7state of the economy. KNI show that a standard neoclassical model can generate
the news-driven cycles only if ﬁrms are collateral constrained in ﬁnancing inputs
and a productive asset with ﬁxed supply, i.e., land, is used as collateral. We show
that the news-driven cycles can be generated in a standard model without land. If
capital goods are used as collateral and they can be traded in the market at the
market price, which equals Tobin’s Q, the same mechanism as that in KNI works.
The common feature of our models and KNI’s models is that the input costs,
such as wage payment and costs for material inputs, are subject to collateral con-
straint and that the price of the collateralized asset moves in response to a change
in expectations or a news about the future. The input costs in our models may
be interpreted as working capital or “liquidity” that ﬁrms need inevitably in their
daily operations. Both our models and KNI’s models indicate that the collateral
constraint on liquidity may be a relevant and important feature in understanding
the business cycles in the real world.
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